Comprehensive quantitative dynamic accident modelling framework for chemical plants by Al-shanini, Ali Hassan Ali
 COMPREHENSIVE QUANTITATIVE DYNAMIC ACCIDENT MODELLING 
FRAMEWORK FOR CHEMICAL PLANTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ALI HASAN ALI AL-SHANINI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITI TEKNOLOGI MALAYSIA.  
  
COMPREHENSIVE QUANTITATIVE DYNAMIC ACCIDENT MODELLING 
FRAMEWORK FOR CHEMICAL PLANTS  
 
 
 
ALI HASAN ALI AL-SHANINI 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the 
requirements for the award of the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy (Chemical Engineering) 
 
 
 
Faculty of Chemical Engineering 
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia 
 
 
 
MARCH 2015  
iii 
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
To Almighty Allah for His Mercy and Blessings 
To my beloved parents for their supporting supplications and love 
 
 
  
iv 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
I would like to appreciate the effort of my supervisors, Prof. Dr. Arshad 
Ahmad and Prof. Dr. Faisal I. khan for their guidance, assistance, intellectual 
support, and constructive advices during the course of my PhD research. My 
appreciations go to all of the staff of Chemical Engineering Faculty (UTM) and 
members of Institute of Hydrogen Economy (IHE). 
I am grateful to Hadhramout University for their financial support during the 
course of my study.  
Special thanks to my beloved mother, Saeeda, and my beloved late father, 
Hasan, for their love, support, care, and supplications. It would not have been easy 
for me without your constant prayers and encouragement. My heartiest thanks to my 
wife and daughters Jna and Khadega; you give me soothing effects from your 
embraces and smiles whenever I felt stressed. I appreciate the assistance and 
endurance of my whole family members; brothers, sisters, uncles, aunties, and 
brothers in law. Special thanks to my dearest friend Jamal Bahah for all his 
assistance, help, and encouragement. May Allah reward you all.  
Last but not least, I am most thankful to my friends and fellow PhD 
colleagues for their continuous support and encouragement. 
  
v 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis introduces a comprehensive accident modelling approach that 
considers hazards associated with process plants including those that originate from 
the process itself; human factors including management and organizational errors; 
natural events related hazards; and intentional and security hazards in a risk 
assessment framework. The model is based on a series of plant protection systems, 
which are release, dispersion, ignition, toxicity, escalation, and damage control and 
emergency management prevention barriers. These six prevention barriers are 
arranged according to a typical sequence of accident propagation path. Based on 
successes and failures of these barriers, a spectrum of consequences is generated. 
Each consequence carries a unique probability of occurrence determined using event 
tree analysis. To facilitate this computation, the probability of failure for each 
prevention barrier is computed using fault tree analysis. In carrying out these 
computations, reliability data from established database are utilized. On occasion 
where reliability data is lacking, expert judgment is used, and evidence theory is 
applied to aggregate these experts’ opinion, which might be conflicting. This 
modelling framework also provides two important features; (i) the capability to 
dynamically update failure probabilities of prevention barriers based on precursor 
data, and (ii) providing prediction of future events. The first task is achieved 
effectively using Bayesian theory; while in the second task, Bayesian-grey model 
emerged as the most promising strategy with overall mean absolute percentage error 
of 18.07% based on three case studies, compared to 31.4% for the Poisson model, 
22.37% for the first-order grey model, and 22.4% for the second-order grey model. 
The results obtained illustrated the potentials of the proposed modelling strategy in 
anticipating failures, identifying the location of failures and predicting future events. 
These insights are important in planning targeted plant maintenance and management 
of change, in addition to facilitating the implementation of standard operating 
procedures in a process plant.  
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ABSTRAK 
Tesis ini memperkenalkan pendekatan pemodelan kemalangan yang 
komprehensif yang mengambilkira bahaya-bahaya yang berkaitan dengan loji proses 
termasuk yang bersumberkan proses itu sendiri, faktor manusia termasuk kesilapan 
pengurusan dan organisasi; bahaya bersumberkan kejadian alam semulajadi; dan 
bahaya dari aspek keselamatan dan tindakan yang disengajakan dalam kerangka 
pentaksiran risiko. Model ini berdasarkan satu siri sistem perlindungan loji, iaitu 
penghalang pencegahan bagi mengawal pelepasan, penyerakan, pencucuhan, 
ketoksidan, peningkatan dan pengendalian kerosakan dan pengurusan kecemasan. 
Enam penghalang pencegahan ini disusun mengikuti turutan biasa laluan penyebaran 
kemalangan. Berdasarkan kejayaan-kejayaan dan kegagalan-kegagalan penghalang-
penghalang ini, satu spektrum akibat-akibat dihasilkan. Setiap akibat mempunyai 
kebarangkalian untuk berlaku yang unik yang dikira dengan menggunakan analisis 
pokok kesalahan. Bagi melaksanakan pengiraan ini, kebarangkalian kegagalan bagi 
setiap penghalang pencegahan dikira dengan menggunakan analisis pokok kesalahan. 
Dalam melaksanakan pengiraan ini, data kebolehpercayaan dari pengkalan data 
digunakan. Apabila data kebolehpercayaan tidak boleh didapati, pandangan pakar 
digunakan, dan teori bukti digunakan bagi mengagregatkan pandangan-pandangan 
pakar yang mungkin bertentangan. Kerangka permodelan ini juga menawarkan dua 
ciri iaitu; (i) kebolehan untuk mengemaskini kebarangkalian kegagalan bagi 
penghalang pencegahan secara dinamik berdasarkan data pelopor, dan (ii) 
memberikan ramalan kejadian masa hadapan. Tugas pertama dicapai dengan 
berkesan dengan menggunakan teori Bayesian, manakala bagi tugas kedua, model 
Bayesian-kelabu muncul sebagai strategi yang paling berjaya, dengan purata 
keseluruhan ralat ramalan 18.07 % berdasarkan tiga kes kajian, berbanding dengan 
31.4 % bagi model Poisson, manakala 22.37% untuk model kelabu terbitan pertama, 
dan 22.4% untuk model kelabu terbitan kedua. Keputusan yang diperoleh 
menunjukkan potensi model yang dicadangkan dalam menjangka kegagalan, 
mengenalpasti lokasi kegagalan dan meramal kejadian masa depan. Maklumat 
mendalam ini penting dalam perancangan penyelenggaraan loji yang disasar dan 
pengurusan perubahan, selain daripada membantu perlaksanaan prosedur piawai 
operasi loji proses.  
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CHAPTER 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
The chemical process industry (CPI) involves process plants of various 
complexities that deal with variety of hazardous materials, and diverse equipment. 
The advent of new designs aiming at achieving high product quality and operation 
performance further complicates the condition as they are typically configured with 
higher degree of heat integrations and built with lower over-design margin. This 
leads to higher performance process plants that are more difficult to manage. In 
ensuring that the objectives of plant operations are achieved, process plants are 
equipped with several layers of protection that includes various automated features 
and management procedures. At the base level, comprehensive process control 
functions are configured and installed to ensure the smoothness of operation and 
eliminate deviations from the intended operating conditions so that the desired 
performance is achieved and unwanted incidents are prevented. This is backed up by 
alarms to alert the plant operators when deviations are larger than allowable limits. 
Should these two main plant operation functions failed, the plant would be protected 
by safety interlock functions and relieve devices to enable more aggressive recovery 
from the unintended deviations. Nevertheless, despite all these measures, deviations 
continue to happen, some of which result in materials and/or energy releases. For this 
reason, process plants are also aided by mitigating measures in the form of protection 
barriers to prevent further escalation of hazards in the event of materials and/or 
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energy releases. Unfortunately, history has shown that accidents continue to happen 
impacting the livelihood of workers and the surrounding community in different 
ways including casualties, enormous property damages, loss of business 
opportunities as well as others. Examples of these are provided in the next chapter. 
It is generally accepted that although zero accident situation cannot be 
achieved in real life as there are many sources of potential errors within the plant 
system as well as external factors that can serve as triggering factors; their 
occurrences can be made less frequent with impact being mitigated. This calls for 
new initiatives at various stages of plant life cycles beginning from the design, 
installation, commissioning and operations. However, what is more urgently needed 
is to address the safety performances of existing plants, especially those that have 
been in service for some number of years. In this perspective, the issue of 
maintenance, upgrade and management of change are of paramount importance, and 
one important process safety tool that can facilitate such efforts is accident 
modelling. 
Over the years, many forms accident models have been proposed and these 
models can be classified into four main categories e.g., sequential, epidemiological, 
systematic, and formal.  The capabilities and limitations of the developed accident 
models are varying depending on purpose, focuses, and area of application. 
However, models that deal with process hazards and chemical process plant are rare 
(Rathnayaka et al., 2011a). Among these few, a class of the Dynamic Sequential 
Accident Modelling (DSAM) known as SHIPP model is considered most promising 
as it integrates release events involving process hazards with typical plant safety 
mitigation barriers in a systematic manner (Al-shanini et al., 2014a). However, upon 
scrutiny, SHIPP model is found lacking from a number of perspectives. Since it was 
formulated focussing on fire and explosion, it lacks the ability to deal with toxic 
releases. It is also unable to handle simultaneous failure events involving multiple 
categories, which is quite often the case in real situations. Furthermore, the accident 
sequence is also dependent on how the failure case was deduced, and as such 
reducing the applicability of the model when an abrupt failure occurs.  For example, 
if explosion occurs abruptly as the first triggering event, the logical flow of the 
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proposed prevention barriers falls apart. The model also neglects the potential 
hazards due to intentional manmade (sabotage/terrorism) acts and unwanted natural 
events related hazards. 
Owing to the potential of this model despite the current weaknesses, it is 
proposed that this model be extended, improved, and reformulated into something 
more comprehensive, generic, and accurate to be used in the CPI. Having such 
models, more accurate and valuable outputs can be obtained, which can then be used 
to improve the prevention plans of accident through supporting risk-based decision 
for safer chemical plants. 
1.2 Objectives of the Research 
The main objective of this study is to develop a generic and comprehensive 
process hazards accident model for the chemical industry based on SHIPP 
methodology. The objective can be detailed out as follows: 
1. To investigate the use of SHIPP model in analysing accidents in selected case 
studies as a proof of concept on the applicability of DSAM in the CPI. 
2. To formulate a comprehensive dynamic accident model that considers all 
plausible hazards; process hazards, natural events related hazards, intentional 
manmade & security hazards, and the interaction between them in one 
framework. 
3. To propose a methodology to overcome uncertainties arising from human (or 
expert) judgement on failure rates using evidence theory. 
4. To improve the predictive capability of the proposed accident model by 
evaluating prediction methods for effective use in data-scarce environment. 
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5. To develop dynamic risk management methodology for vulnerability ranking 
of system’s basic elements to improve the efficiency of risk-based decision 
activities. 
1.3 Research Scope 
To satisfy the objectives of this study, the scope and limitation of this 
research works are as follows: 
i) Computation of Probability for Failure Cases 
Failure probabilities of all prevention barriers are causally modelled using 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). On occasion of lack of data, expert’s opinions 
are used, and this brings uncertainty and conflict as expert’s opinion can be 
subjective. To minimize this impact, evidence theory is used. 
ii) Modelling of Consequence Horizon 
The consequence horizon resulting for all failure cases are generated using 
Event-Tree Analysis (ETA).  
iii) Modelling of Barrier’s Dynamic Vulnerability 
The probability of failures of all prevention barriers changes over time 
dynamically. To track these changes, a dynamic updating algorithm of 
barriers failure probabilities based on plant precursor data are developed 
using Bayesian statistics on the ET model. In doing so, the trend of barrier 
failure probabilities can be observed. 
iv) Improving Accident Prediction 
As alternatives to Poisson model, the use of time series grey model, and 
Bayesian-grey models are explored. Performance evaluation is carried out 
against Poisson model on selected case studies. 
v) Formulation of Comprehensive Framework 
The comprehensive model proposed extends the SHIPP methodology. In 
addition to process hazards used in SHIPP, natural disaster and manmade 
hazards are included.  
vi) Case Studies 
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A number of case studies are used in this study. The choice is made based 
on suitability of the issues addressed and availability of data. The case 
studies include hydrogen stations (both offsite and onsite stations) for 
evaluating SHIPP model, LNG plant for evaluating comprehensive model 
and the dynamic risk methodology, CSTR and vessel processing precursor 
data as well as IC data for evaluating the prediction study. 
vii) Computation Tools 
A number of computation tools are used. All Bayesian network 
computations are carried out externally using open source Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo simulation software (WinBUGS). Grey model computations 
are carried out using MATLAB R2010b software. 
1.4 Research Significance/Contribution 
This research hopes to develop a comprehensive, generic, and systematic 
accident model for chemical plants. The model intensively considers all plausible 
hazards roots that could cause CPI accidents. It provides the following capabilities: 
i. Estimation of failures probability of all prevention barriers  
ii. Identification of the relative vulnerability of the barriers over time 
iii. Predictions of  future incidents 
These capabilities would facilitate process safety management efforts so that targeted 
maintenance program can be designed, thus reducing the overall cost of plant 
operation. 
In addition, three important features are also introduced: 
i. Better prediction 
ii. Evidence theory to overcome experts’ opinions uncertainty raised 
from conflict and ignorance 
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iii. The application of hierarchical Bayesian approach (HBA) and 
Bayesian network (BN) to reliability analysis techniques 
The publications offered from this work contribute to the overall body of 
knowledge in process safety management. They are as listed in the Appendix. 
1.5 Layout of Thesis 
The organization of thesis is summarized in Figure 1.1. Following this 
introductory chapter, a detailed literature review on the subject is presented, 
focussing on accident models that are well suited for the CPI. The general 
classification of accident models are provided and explained, however; more 
extensive analyses and discussions are given to the Dynamic Sequential Accident 
Modelling approach. In chapter 3, the application of the SHIPP model to hydrogen 
stations is explained. Two case studies were considered, i.e. off-site station where 
hydrogen is supplied using trucks, and an on-site station where hydrogen production 
facility is included onsite. Chapter 4 elaborates on the proposed comprehensive 
preventive and predictive accident model. The model has been implemented into 
LNG facility includes pipeline, lignification facility, and offshore export port. Next 
in chapter 5, efforts to improve the accident prediction capability of the unwanted 
consequence, in data-scarce environment, has been taken place. This is followed by 
an effort to introduce dynamic risk management methodology as ranking tool to 
prioritize plant’s plans, this is in chapter 6. Finally, in chapter 7, findings of this 
thesis are concluded, and recommendations for future works have been suggested. 
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Figure 1.1  Flow chart showing Thesis organization 
Chapter 1:General  Introduction 
-  
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
-  Accident modelling analyzes in CPI 
-  Process hazards models, the capabilities and weaknesses 
-  Gap analysis 
Chapter 3: Process Hazarda Accident Modelling and Saftey Measure to 
Hydrogen stations  
-  Develop the causal modeling of prevention barriers of H2 stations using FT A 
-  Apply bayesian theory to update babriers and end-state events of event tree (ET 
) model through the utlization of precursor data  
-  Apply stocastic predictiom model of Poisson-gamma to predict the expected 
number of deviation in next time inteval 
Chapter 4: The development of Comperhensive Prevetive Process Hazards 
Accident Model 
-  Model external hazards  raise from natutral and sabotage&terrorsium in the 
generic FT cusual models of prevention barriers 
-  Develop a CPI generic accident sequence 
-  Introducing dynamic updating of prevention barriers failure probabilities 
-  Uncertainity analysis of basic events failure probabilities 
-  Application to LNG facility 
Chapter 5: Accident Prediction in Data-Scarce Environment 
- The mathemical modelling of prediction models in data-scarce environment  
-  Apply two different data configurations to the grey and combined models  
-  Comparsion study of the models to three case studies data 
  
Chapter 6: The Development of Dynamic Risk Management 
Methodology Using Bayesian Network and Herarichical Bayesian 
Approach 
-   Scenario generation using Bayesian network (BN) 
-  Nodes' priors updating using herarchical bayesian appraoch (HBA) 
-  Application of the methodology to toxic prevention barrier (TPB) 
Chapter 7: Thesis conclusions & recommendations 
-  The summary of thesis with highlithing the significant of the research 
-  The general conclusion 
-   Recommendations for future work 
 
  
REFERENCES 
Abbasi, T. and Abbasi, S. (2007). The Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion 
(Bleve): Mechanism, Consequence Assessment, Management. Journal of 
Hazardous Materials, 141(3), 489-519. 
Abbasi, T., Pasman, H. and Abbasi, S. (2010). A Scheme for the Classification of 
Explosions in the Chemical Process Industry. Journal of hazardous materials, 
174(1), 270-280. 
Abramson, L. (1994). A Unified Statistical Approach to Estimating Core Damage 
Frequency Based on Accident Sequence Precursor Conditional Core Damage 
Probabilities. PSAM-II, San Diego, California, 20-25. 
Ahmed, M. M., Kutty, S., Shariff, A. M. and Idris, M. F. K. O. (2012) Published. 
Hazard Analysis and Safe Transportation Procedure for Fuel Outlets.  
Proceedings of the 1st International Conference in Safety and Crisis 
Management in the Construction, Tourism and SME Sectors, Universal-
Publishers, 128. 
Al-Shanini, A., Ahmad, A. and Khan, F. (2014a). Accident Modelling and Analysis 
in Process Industries. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 
32(0), 319-334. 
Al-Shanini, A., Ahmad, A. and Khan, F. (2014b). Accident Modelling and Safety 
Measure Design of a Hydrogen Station. International Journal of Hydrogen 
Energy. 
Ali, T. and Dutta, P. (2012). Methods to Obtain Basic Probability Assignment in 
Evidence Theory. International Journal of Computer Applications, 38. 
Antonioni, G., Bonvicini, S., Spadoni, G. and Cozzani, V. (2009). Development of a 
Framework for the Risk Assessment of Na-Tech Accidental Events. 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 94(9), 1442-1450. 
181 
 
 
 
Antonioni, G., Spadoni, G. and Cozzani, V. (2007). A Methodology for the 
Quantitative Risk Assessment of Major Accidents Triggered by Seismic 
Events. Journal of hazardous materials, 147(1), 48-59. 
Atkins, W. (1998). Development of Methods to Assess the Significance of Domino 
Effects from Major Hazard Sites. Health and Safety Executive, HMSO, 
London. 
Aven, T. and Vinnem, J. (2007). Risk Management, with Applications from the 
Offshore Oil and Gas Industry. NY: Springer Verlag. 
Bae, H.-R., Grandhi, R. V. and Canfield, R. A. (2004). An Approximation Approach 
for Uncertainty Quantification Using Evidence Theory. Reliability 
Engineering & System Safety, 86(3), 215-225. 
Bagster, D. and Pitblado, R. (1991). Estimation of Domino Incident Frequencies- an 
Approach. Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 69(4), 195-199. 
Bahr, N. (2000). System Safety Engineering and Risk Assessment. International 
Encyclopedia of Ergonomics and Human Factors, 2, 1604. 
Bajpai, S. and Gupta, J. (2005). Site Security for Chemical Process Industries. 
Journal of loss prevention in the process industries, 18(4), 301-309. 
Bajpai, S. and Gupta, J. (2007). Terror-Proofing Chemical Process Industries. 
Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 85(6), 559-565. 
Ballard, G. (1985) Published. An Analysis of Dependent Failures in the Ornl-
Precursor Study (Nureg/Cr-2497).  Proceedings of the ANS/ENS Int. Topical 
Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Methods and Applications, San Francisco, Ca 
(24 February–1 March, 1985). 
Beale, J. (2006). The Facts About Lng. Prepared for AES Sparrows Point LNG. 
Bearfield, G. and Marsh, W. (2005). Generalising Event Trees Using Bayesian 
Networks with a Case Study of Train Derailment. Computer Safety, 
Reliability, and Security, 52-66. 
Bennett, M. (2003). Tics, Tims, and Terrorists Commodity Chemicals Take on a 
Sinister Role as Potential Terrorist Tools. TODAYS CHEMIST AT WORK, 
12(4), 21-26. 
Bier, V. M. (1993). Statistical Methods for the Use of Accident Precursor Data in 
Estimating the Frequency of Rare Events. Reliability Engineering & System 
Safety, 41(3), 267-280. 
182 
 
 
 
Bier, V. M. and Mosleh, A. (1990). The Analysis of Accident Precursors and near 
Misses: Implications for Risk Assessment and Risk Management. Reliability 
Engineering & System Safety, 27(1), 91-101. 
Bier, V. M. and Yi, W. (1995). A Bayesian Method for Analyzing Dependencies in 
Precursor Data. International Journal of Forecasting, 11(1), 25-41. 
Bird Jr, F. and Germain, G. (1996). Loss Control Management: Practical Loss 
Control Leadership, Rev Ed. Det Norske Veritas (USA), Loganville, GA. 
Bobbio, A., Portinale, L., Minichino, M. and Ciancamerla, E. (2001). Improving the 
Analysis of Dependable Systems by Mapping Fault Trees into Bayesian 
Networks. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 71(3), 249-260. 
Bradlow, E. T., Hardie, B. G. and Fader, P. S. (2002). Bayesian Inference for the 
Negative Binomial Distribution Via Polynomial Expansions. Journal of 
Computational and Graphical Statistics, 11(1). 
Brambilla, S. and Manca, D. (2010). The Viareggio Lpg Railway Accident: Event 
Reconstruction and Modeling. Journal of hazardous materials, 182(1), 346-
357. 
Buratti, N., Ferracutib, B., Savoiaa, M., Antonionic, G. and Cozzanic, V. (2012). A 
Fuzzy-Sets Based Approach for Modelling Uncertainties in Quantitative Risk 
Assessment of Industrial Plants under Seismic Actions. CHEMICAL 
ENGINEERING, 26. 
Busini, V., Marzo, E., Callioni, A. and Rota, R. (2011). Definition of a Short-Cut 
Methodology for Assessing Earthquake-Related Na-Tech Risk. Journal of 
hazardous materials, 192(1), 329-339. 
Campedel, M., Cozzani, V., Garcia-Agreda, A. and Salzano, E. (2008a). Extending 
the Quantitative Assessment of Industrial Risks to Earthquake Effects. Risk 
analysis, 28(5), 1231-1246. 
Campedel, M., Cozzani, V., Krausmann, E. and Cruz, A. M. (2008b) Published. 
Analysis of Natech Accidents Recorded in Major Accident Databases.  Proc. 
PSAM. 
Ccps (1985). Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures. New York, American 
Institute of Chemical Engineers. 
Ccps (1999). Guidelines for Consequence Analysis of Chemical Releases. Wiley-
AIChE. 
183 
 
 
 
Ccps (2000). Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis (2nd 
Edition). Center for Chemical Process Safety/AIChE. 
Čepin, M. (2011). Event Tree Analysis. Assessment of Power System Reliability. 
(pp. 89-99). Springer. 
Chang, J. I. and Lin, C.-C. (2006). A Study of Storage Tank Accidents. Journal of 
loss prevention in the process industries, 19(1), 51-59. 
Chang, N.-B. and Tseng, C. (1999). Optimal Evaluation of Expansion Alternatives 
for Existing Air Quality Monitoring Network by Grey Compromise 
Programing. Journal of environmental management, 56(1), 61-77. 
Chapman, C. (1997). Project Risk Analysis and Management—Pram the Generic 
Process. International Journal of Project Management, 15(5), 273-281. 
Chen, C.-C., Wang, T.-C., Chen, L.-Y., Dai, J.-H. and Shu, C.-M. (2010). Loss 
Prevention in the Petrochemical and Chemical-Process High-Tech Industries 
in Taiwan. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 23(4), 531-
538. 
Chen, Z. and Mcgee, M. (2008). A Bayesian Approach to Zero-Numerator Problems 
Using Hierarchical Models. J Data Sci, 6, 261-8. 
Cheng, Y.-L. (2000). Uncertainties in Fault Tree Analysis. Tamkang Journal of 
Science and Engineering, 3(1), 23-30. 
Clementel, S. and Galvagni, R. (1984). The Use of the Event Tree in the Design of 
Nuclear Power Plants. Environment International, 10(5–6), 377-382. 
Cleveland, C., Hogan, C. and Saundry, P. (2010). Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. The 
Encyclopedia of Earth. 
Clewell Iii, H. J. and Andersen, M. E. (1986). A Multiple Dose-Route Physiological 
Pharmacokinetic Model for Volatile Chemicals Using Acsl/Pc. DTIC 
Document. 
Cooke, R. and Goossens, L. (1990). The Accident Sequence Precursor Methodology 
for the European Post-Seveso Era. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 
27(1), 117-130. 
Cooke, R., Goossens, L., Hale, A. and Van Der Horst, J. (1987). Accident Sequence 
Precursor Methodology—a Feasibility Study for the Chemical Process 
Industries. Report for the Dutch Ministry of Environment, TUDelft/TNO 
Apeldoorn. 
184 
 
 
 
Cozzani, V., Campedel, M., Renni, E. and Krausmann, E. (2010). Industrial 
Accidents Triggered by Flood Events: Analysis of Past Accidents. Journal of 
hazardous materials, 175(1), 501-509. 
Cozzani, V. and Salzano, E. (2004). The Quantitative Assessment of Domino Effects 
Caused by Overpressure: Part I. Probit Models. Journal of Hazardous 
Materials, 107(3), 67-80. 
Cozzarli, V. (2010). Towards the Inclusion of External Factors in Quantitative Risk 
Assessment: The Analysis of Natech Accident Scenarios. CHEMICAL 
ENGINEERING, 19. 
Crowl, D. A. and Louvar, J. F. (2001). Chemical Process Safety: Fundamentals with 
Applications. Prentice Hall. 
Crump, K. S. (1984). A New Method for Determining Allowable Daily Intakes. 
Fundamental and applied toxicology, 4(5), 854-871. 
Cruz, A. M. and Krausmann, E. (2009). Hazardous-Materials Releases from 
Offshore Oil and Gas Facilities and Emergency Response Following 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries, 22(1), 59-65. 
Cruz, A. M. and Okada, N. (2008). Methodology for Preliminary Assessment of 
Natech Risk in Urban Areas. Natural Hazards, 46(2), 199-220. 
CSB, March 20, 2007. Investigation Report; Reﬁnery Explosion and Fire. Report no. 
2005-04-I-TX. http://www.csb.gov/investigations/detail.aspx?SID¼20. 
CSB, 2008a. Investigation Report; Little General Store e Propane Explosion. Report 
no. 2007-04-I-WV, September 2008. www.csb.gov/assets/document/ 
CSBFinalReportLittleGeneral.pdf. 
CSB, 2008b. Investigation Report; LPG Fire at ValeroeMckee Reﬁnery. Report 
no.2007-05-I-TX, July 2008. 
http://www.csb.gov/investigations/detail.aspx?SID¼12. 
CSB, 2008c. Barton Solvents Static Spark Ignites Explosion inside Flammable 
LiquidStorage Tank. Case study no. 2007-06-I-KS, June 26, 2008. 
http://www.csb.gov/investigations/detail.aspx?SID¼58. 
CSB, 2008d. Static Spark Ignites Flammable Liquid during Portable Tank 
FillingOperation case study no. 2008-02-I-IA,September, 2008. 
www.csb.gov/assets/document/Barton_Case_Study__9_18_2008.pdf. 
185 
 
 
 
CSB, 2010. Investigation Report; Xcel Energy Hydroelectric Plant Penstock 
Fire.Report no. 2008-01-I-CO, August 2010. 
http://www.csb.gov/investigations/detail.aspx?SID¼9. 
CSB, 2009a. Investigation Report. In: Runway Reaction. T2 Laboratories, INC. 
Reportno. 2008-3-I-FL, September 15, 2009. 
http://www.csb.gov/newsroom/detail.aspx?nid¼281. 
CSB, 2009b. Investigation Report; Sugar Dust Explosion and Fire. Report no. 2008-
05-I-GA, September 15, 2009. 
http://www.csb.gov/investigations/detail.aspx?SID¼6. 
CSB, January 2011. Investigation Report, Pesticide Chemical Runaway 
ReactionPressure Vessel Explosion. Report no. 2008-08-I-WV. 
http://www.csb.gov/ 
Dandrieux, A., Dimbour, J. and Dusserre, G. (2006). Are Dispersion Models Suitable 
for Simulating Small Gaseous Chlorine Releases? Journal of Loss Prevention 
in the Process Industries, 19(6), 683-689. 
Deng, J.-L. (1989). Introduction to Grey System Theory. The Journal of grey system, 
1(1), 1-24. 
Ditali, S., Colombi, M., Moreschini, G. and Senni, S. (2000). Consequence Analysis 
in Lpg Installation Using an Integrated Computer Package. Journal of 
hazardous materials, 71(1), 159-177. 
Dubois, D. and Prade, H. (1992). On the Combination of Evidence in Various 
Mathematical Frameworks. Reliability Data Collection and Analysis. (pp. 
213-241). Springer. 
Duijm, N. J. and Markert, F. (2009). Safety-Barrier Diagrams as a Tool for 
Modelling Safety of Hydrogen Applications. International Journal of 
Hydrogen Energy, 34(14), 5862-5868. 
Dunjó, J., Fthenakis, V., Vílchez, J. A. and Arnaldos, J. (2010). Hazard and 
Operability (Hazop) Analysis. A Literature Review. Journal of hazardous 
materials, 173(1), 19-32. 
Dunn, S. (2002). Hydrogen Futures: Toward a Sustainable Energy System. 
International journal of hydrogen energy, 27(3), 235-264. 
186 
 
 
 
Eisenberg, N. A., Lynch, C. J. and Breeding, R. J. (1975). Vulnerability Model. A 
Simulation System for Assessing Damage Resulting from Marine Spills. 
DTIC Document. 
El-Harbawi, M., Mustapha, S., Choong, T. S., Rashid, Z. A., Rashid, S. A. and 
Sherif, A. (2010). Scia: Gis-Based Software for Assessing the Impacts from 
Chemical Industrial Accidents. Practice Periodical of Hazardous, Toxic, and 
Radioactive Waste Management, 14(2), 104-114. 
El Harbawi, M., Mustapha, S., Choong, T. S. Y., Rashid, S. A., Kadir, S. and Rashid, 
Z. A. (2008). Rapid Analysis of Risk Assessment Using Developed 
Simulation of Chemical Industrial Accidents Software Package. International 
Journal of Environmental Science & Technology, 5(1), 53-64. 
Epa, N. (1999). Area Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres (Aloha). User’s Manual, 
US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Washington, DC. 
Ericson, C. A. (2005). Hazard Analysis Techniques for System Safety. John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Fabbrocino, G., Iervolino, I., Orlando, F. and Salzano, E. (2005). Quantitative Risk 
Analysis of Oil Storage Facilities in Seismic Areas. Journal of hazardous 
materials, 123(1), 61-69. 
Ferdous, R., Khan, F., Sadiq, R., Amyotte, P. and Veitch, B. (2009a). Handling Data 
Uncertainties in Event Tree Analysis. Process Safety and Environmental 
Protection, 87(5), 283-292. 
Ferdous, R., Khan, F., Veitch, B. and Amyotte, P. R. (2009b). Methodology for 
Computer Aided Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis. Process Safety and 
Environmental Protection, 87(4), 217-226. 
Ferdous, R., Khan, F. I., Veitch, B. and Amyotte, P. R. (2007). Methodology for 
Computer-Aided Fault Tree Analysis. Process Safety and Environmental 
Protection, 85(1), 70-80. 
Fullwood, R. R. (2000). Probabilistic Safety Assessment in the Chemical and 
Nuclear Industries. Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Galderisi, A., Ceudech, A. and Pistucci, M. (2008). A Method for Na-Tech Risk 
Assessment as Supporting Tool for Land Use Planning Mitigation Strategies. 
Natural Hazards, 46(2), 221-241. 
187 
 
 
 
Glossop, M., Loannides, A. and Gould, J. (2000). Review of Hazard Identification 
Techniques. Health & Safety Laboratory. 
Goossens, L. and Cooke, R. (1997). Applications of Some Risk Assessment 
Techniques: Formal Expert Judgement and Accident Sequence Precursors. 
Safety science, 26(1), 35-47. 
Gould, J., Glossop, M. and Ioannides, A. (2005). Review of Hazard Identification 
Techniques. Health & Safety Laboratory Report, UK. 
Goyet, J., Straub, D. and Faber, M. H. (2002). Risk Based Inspection Planning: 
Methodology and Application to an Offshore Structure. Revue française de 
génie civil, 6(3), 489-503. 
Haiqin, W. (2006) Published. Using Sensitivity Analysis to Validate Bayesian 
Networks for Airplane Subsystem Diagnosis.  Aerospace Conference, 2006 
IEEE, 0-0 0. 10 pp. 
Hakobyan, A., Aldemir, T., Denning, R., Dunagan, S., Kunsman, D., Rutt, B. and 
Catalyurek, U. (2008). Dynamic Generation of Accident Progression Event 
Trees. Nuclear Engineering and Design, 238(12), 3457-3467. 
Hamada, M. S., Wilson, A., Reese, C. S. and Martz, H. (2008). Bayesian Reliability. 
Springer. 
Heckerman, D. (2008). A Tutorial on Learning with Bayesian Networks Innovations 
in Bayesian Networks. In: Holmes, D. and Jain, L. (eds.) (pp. 33-82). 
Springer Berlin / Heidelberg. 
Heinrich, H. W., Petersen, D. and Ross, N. (1980). Principles of Accident 
Prevention. Industrial accident prevention, 20-29. 
Hirschler, M. M. (1992). Fire Hazard and Fire Risk Assessment. Astm International. 
Hoertner, H., Frey, W., Von Linden, J. and Reichart, G. (Year) Published. German 
Precursor Study-Methods and Results.  Proceedings of the ANSENS 
international topical meeting on PSA methods and applications. San 
Francisco, CA, 1985. 
Hoertner, H. and Kafka, P. (1986). Precursor Studies. IAEA Report TECMWJ-387, 
Vienna. 
Hollnagel, E. (1998). Cream-Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method. 
Elsevier Science Ltd, Oxford. 
Hollnagel, E. (2004). Barriers and Accident Prevention. Ashgate Pub Limited. 
188 
 
 
 
Holmes, N. S. and Morawska, L. (2006). A Review of Dispersion Modelling and Its 
Application to the Dispersion of Particles: An Overview of Different 
Dispersion Models Available. Atmospheric Environment, 40(30), 5902-5928. 
Hong, E.-S., Lee, I.-M., Shin, H.-S., Nam, S.-W. and Kong, J.-S. (2009). 
Quantitative Risk Evaluation Based on Event Tree Analysis Technique: 
Application to the Design of Shield Tbm. Tunnelling and Underground Space 
Technology, 24(3), 269-277. 
Hsu, C.-C. and Chen, C.-Y. (2003). Applications of Improved Grey Prediction 
Model for Power Demand Forecasting. Energy Conversion and Management, 
44(14), 2241-2249. 
Hsu, L.-C. (2003). Applying the Grey Prediction Model to the Global Integrated 
Circuit Industry. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 70(6), 563-
574. 
Hsu, L.-C. and Wang, C.-H. (2007). Forecasting the Output of Integrated Circuit 
Industry Using a Grey Model Improved by the Bayesian Analysis. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 74(6), 843-853. 
Hyapproval, W. (2007). Handbook for Hydrogen Refuelling Station Approval. 
Technical Report Deliverable 2.2, Version 2.0, HyApproval Consortium, 
www. hyapproval. org. 
Hyatt, N. (2003). Guidelines for Process Hazards Analysis (Pha, Hazop), Hazards 
Identification, and Risk Analysis. CRC press. 
Jaeger, C. D. (2003). Chemical Facility Vulnerability Assessment Project. Journal of 
hazardous materials, 104(1), 207-213. 
Jang, N., Koo, J., Kim, H., Shin, D. and Sup Yoon, E. (2011). A Study on the 
Financial Approach of Risk Assessment Using Chemical Accident Records in 
Chemical Process Industries. Asia‐ Pacific Journal of Chemical Engineering, 
6(3), 509-517. 
Johnson, C. and Holloway, C. (2003). A Survey of Logic Formalisms to Support 
Mishap Analysis. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 80(3), 271-291. 
Johnson, J. W. and Rasmuson, D. M. (1996). The Us Nrc's Accident Sequence 
Precursor Program: An Overview and Development of a Bayesian Approach 
to Estimate Core Damage Frequency Using Precursor Information. Reliability 
Engineering & System Safety, 53(2), 205-216. 
189 
 
 
 
Ju-Long, D. (1982). Control Problems of Grey Systems. Systems & Control Letters, 
1(5), 288-294. 
Jun, C.-H., Y. Chang, S., Hong, Y. and Yang, H. (1999). A Bayesian Approach to 
Prediction of System Failure Rates by Criticalities under Event Trees. 
International Journal of Production Economics, 60–61(0), 623-628. 
Kalantarnia, M. (2010). Dynamic Risk Assessment Using Accident Precursor Data 
and Bayesian Theory. Memorial University of Newfoundland. 
Kalantarnia, M., Khan, F. and Hawboldt, K. (2009a). Dynamic Risk Assessment 
Using Failure Assessment and Bayesian Theory. Journal of Loss Prevention 
in the Process Industries, 22(5), 600-606. 
Kalantarnia, M., Khan, F. and Hawboldt, K. (2010). Modelling of Bp Texas City 
Refinery Accident Using Dynamic Risk Assessment Approach. Process 
Safety and Environmental Protection, 88(3), 191-199. 
Kalantarnia, M., Khan, F. I. and Hawboldt, K. (2009b) Published. Risk Assessment 
and Management Using Accident Precursors Modeling in Offshore Process 
Operation. ASME. 
Kallen, M. and Van Noortwijk, J. (2003) Published. Inspection and Maintenance 
Decisions Based on Imperfect Inspections.  Proceedings of the European 
Safety and Reliability Conference, Maastricht, The Netherlands. 
Kao, C.-S. and Hu, K.-H. (2002). Acrylic Reactor Runaway and Explosion Accident 
Analysis. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 15(3), 213-
222. 
Kaplan, S. (1992). ‘Expert Information’versus ‘Expert Opinions’. Another Approach 
to the Problem of Eliciting/Combining/Using Expert Knowledge in Pra. 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 35(1), 61-72. 
Karmon, E. (2002). The Risk of Terrorism against Oil and Gas Pipelines in Central 
Asia. The Oil and Gas Routed from Caspian-Caucasus Region: Geopolitics of 
Pipelines, Stability and International Security. 
Kelly, D., Atwood, C. and Consulting, S. (2008) Published. Bayesian Modeling of 
Population Variability: Practical Guidance and Pitfalls.  Ninth international 
conference on probabilistic safety assessment and management, Hong Kong. 
190 
 
 
 
Kelly, D. L. and Smith, C. L. (2009). Bayesian Inference in Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment—the Current State of the Art. Reliability Engineering & System 
Safety, 94(2), 628-643. 
Khakzad, N., Khan, F. and Amyotte, P. (2012a). Dynamic Risk Analysis Using Bow-
Tie Approach. Reliability Engineering & System Safety. 
Khakzad, N., Khan, F. and Amyotte, P. (2012b). Dynamic Safety Analysis of 
Process Systems by Mapping Bow-Tie into Bayesian Network. Process 
Safety and Environmental Protection. 
Khan, F., Sadiq, R. and Haddara, M. (2004). Risk-Based Inspection and Maintenance 
(Rbim): Multi-Attribute Decision-Making with Aggregative Risk Analysis. 
Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 82(6), 398-411. 
Khan, F. I. and Abbasi, S. (1998a). Maxcred–a New Software Package for Rapid 
Risk Assessment in Chemical Process Industries. Environmental modelling & 
software, 14(1), 11-25. 
Khan, F. I. and Abbasi, S. (1998b). Models for Domino Effect Analysis in Chemical 
Process Industries. Process Safety Progress, 17(2), 107-123. 
Khan, F. I. and Abbasi, S. (1998c). Techniques and Methodologies for Risk Analysis 
in Chemical Process Industries. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries, 11(4), 261-277. 
Khan, F. I. and Abbasi, S. (1999a). Hazdig: A New Software Package for Assessing 
the Risks of Accidental Release of Toxic Chemicals. Journal of loss 
prevention in the process industries, 12(2), 167-181. 
Khan, F. I. and Abbasi, S. (1999b). Major Accidents in Process Industries and an 
Analysis of Causes and Consequences. Journal of Loss Prevention in the 
Process Industries, 12(5), 361-378. 
Khan, F. I. and Abbasi, S. (2001). Risk Analysis of a Typical Chemical Industry 
Using Ora Procedure. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 
14(1), 43-59. 
Khan, F. I. and Abbasi, S. A. (1997a). Opthazop—an Effective and Optimum 
Approach for Hazop Study. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries, 10(3), 191-204. 
191 
 
 
 
Khan, F. I. and Abbasi, S. A. (1997b). Tophazop: A Knowledge-Based Software 
Tool for Conducting Hazop in a Rapid, Efficient yet Inexpensive Manner. 
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 10(5–6), 333-343. 
Khan, F. I. and Abbasi, S. A. (1998d). Multivariate Hazard Identification and 
Ranking System. Process Safety Progress, 17(3), 157-170. 
Khan, F. I. and Abbasi, S. A. (1998e). Techniques and Methodologies for Risk 
Analysis in Chemical Process Industries. Journal of Loss Prevention in the 
Process Industries, 11(4), 261-277. 
Khan, F. I. and Abbasi, S. A. (2000). Analytical Simulation and Profat Ii: A New 
Methodology and a Computer Automated Tool for Fault Tree Analysis in 
Chemical Process Industries. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 75(1), 1-27. 
Khan, F. I. and Haddara, M. M. (2003). Risk-Based Maintenance (Rbm): A 
Quantitative Approach for Maintenance/Inspection Scheduling and Planning. 
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 16(6), 561-573. 
Khan, F. I. and Haddara, M. R. (2004). Risk-Based Maintenance of Ethylene Oxide 
Production Facilities. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 108(3), 147-159. 
Kidamll, K., Hurmel, M. and Hassimm, M. H. (2010). Technical Analysis of 
Accident in Chemical Process Industry and Lessons Learnt. CHEMICAL 
ENGINEERING, 19. 
Kikukawa, S. (2008). Consequence Analysis and Safety Verification of Hydrogen 
Fueling Stations Using Cfd Simulation. International Journal of Hydrogen 
Energy, 33(4), 1425-1434. 
Kikukawa, S., Mitsuhashi, H. and Miyake, A. (2009). Risk Assessment for Liquid 
Hydrogen Fueling Stations. International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, 34(2), 
1135-1141. 
Kinoshita, N., Sueki, K., Sasa, K., Kitagawa, J.-I., Ikarashi, S., Nishimura, T., Wong, 
Y.-S., Satou, Y., Handa, K. and Takahashi, T. (2011). Assessment of 
Individual Radionuclide Distributions from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident 
Covering Central-East Japan. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 108(49), 19526-19529. 
Kirchsteiger, C. (1997). Impact of Accident Precursors on Risk Estimates from 
Accident Databases. Journal of Loss Prevention in the process industries, 
10(3), 159-167. 
192 
 
 
 
Kletz, T. (1977). Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosions «. AIChE Loss Prevention, 
11, 50. 
Krishnasamy, L., Khan, F. and Haddara, M. (2005). Development of a Risk-Based 
Maintenance (Rbm) Strategy for a Power-Generating Plant. Journal of Loss 
Prevention in the Process Industries, 18(2), 69-81. 
Kujath, M. F., Amyotte, P. R. and Khan, F. I. (2010). A Conceptual Offshore Oil and 
Gas Process Accident Model. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries, 23(2), 323-330. 
Lachance, J., Tchouvelev, A. and Ohi, J. (2009). Risk-Informed Process and Tools 
for Permitting Hydrogen Fueling Stations. International Journal of Hydrogen 
Energy, 34(14), 5855-5861. 
Ladkin, P. B. (1999). A Quick Introduction Why-Because Analysis. 
Ladkin, P. B. (2005). Why-Because Analysis of the Glenbrook, Nsw Rail Accident 
and Comparison with Hopkins's Accimap. Report RVS-RR-05-05, 19 
December, Faculty of Technology, Bielefeld University. http://www. rvs. uni-
bielefeld. de. 
Laplante, A. (1998). Too Close to Home: A Report on Chemical Accident Risks in 
the United States. US Public Interest Research Group, Washington, DC. 
Lees, F. P. (1996). Loss Prevention in the Process Industries: Hazard Identification, 
Assessment and Control (3 Volume Set). 
Lefevre, E., Colot, O. and Vannoorenberghe, P. (2002). Belief Function Combination 
and Conflict Management. Information fusion, 3(2), 149-162. 
Lenoir, E. M. and Davenport, J. A. (1993). A Survey of Vapor Cloud Explosions: 
Second Update. Process Safety Progress, 12(1), 12-33. 
Leveson, N. (2004). A New Accident Model for Engineering Safer Systems. Safety 
Science, 42(4), 237-270. 
Lewis, C. D. (1982). Industrial and Business Forecasting Methods: A Practical Guide 
to Exponential Smoothing and Curve Fitting. Butterworth Scientific London,, 
UK. 
Li, H. (2007). Hierarchical Risk Assessment of Water Supply Systems. 
Liang, M. T., Zhao, G. F., Chang, C. W. and Liang, C. H. (2001). Evaluating the 
Carbonation Damage to Concrete Bridges Using a Grey Forecasting Model 
193 
 
 
 
Combined with a Statistical Method. Journal of the Chinese Institute of 
Engineers, 24(1), 85-94. 
Lin, C.-T. and Yang, S.-Y. (2003). Forecast of the Output Value of Taiwan's Opto-
Electronics Industry Using the Grey Forecasting Model. Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, 70(2), 177-186. 
Lindell, M. K. and Perry, R. W. (1997). Hazardous Materials Releases in the 
Northridge Earthquake: Implications for Seismic Risk Assessment. Risk 
Analysis, 17(2), 147-156. 
Liu, S. and Lin, Y. (2006). Grey Information: Theory and Practical Applications. 
Springer. 
Lois, E. (1985). Class Specific Approach to Nuclear Power Plant Safety Studies with 
Applications. Maryland Univ., College Park (USA). 
Luo, J., Zheng, M., Zhao, X., Huo, C. and Yang, L. (2006). Simplified Expression 
for Estimating Release Rate of Hazardous Gas from a Hole on High-Pressure 
Pipelines. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 19(4), 362-
366. 
Mahgerefteh, H. and Atti, O. (2004). An Analysis of the Gas Pipeline Explosion at 
Ghislenghien, Belgium. University College London, London. 
Majdara, A. and Wakabayashi, T. (2009). Component-Based Modeling of Systems 
for Automated Fault Tree Generation. Reliability Engineering &amp; System 
Safety, 94(6), 1076-1086. 
Mannan, S. (2004). Lees' Loss Prevention in the Process Industries: Hazard 
Identification, Assessment and Control. Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Mannan, S. and Lees, F. P. (2005). Lee's Loss Prevention in the Process Industries: 
Hazard Identification, Assessment, and Control. Elsevier. 
Marhavilas, P., Koulouriotis, D. and Gemeni, V. (2011). Risk Analysis and 
Assessment Methodologies in the Work Sites: On a Review, Classification 
and Comparative Study of the Scientific Literature of the Period 2000–2009. 
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 24(5), 477-523. 
Markowski, A. S. and Mannan, M. S. (2008). Fuzzy Risk Matrix. Journal of 
hazardous materials, 159(1), 152-157. 
194 
 
 
 
Markowski, A. S. and Mannan, M. S. (2009). Fuzzy Logic for Piping Risk 
Assessment (Pflopa). Journal of loss prevention in the process industries, 
22(6), 921-927. 
Mazloomi, K. and Gomes, C. (2012). Hydrogen as an Energy Carrier: Prospects and 
Challenges. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 16(5), 3024-3033. 
Mccarthy, J. J., Canziani, O. F., Leary, N. A., Dokken, D. J. and White, K. S. (2001). 
Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability: Contribution 
of Working Group Ii to the Third Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press. 
Mcdermott, R. E., Mikulak, R. J. and Beauregard, M. R. (2008). The Basics of Fmea. 
Productivity Press. 
Mckelvey, T. C. (1988). How to Improve the Effectiveness of Hazard and 
Operability Analysis. Reliability, IEEE Transactions on, 37(2), 167-170. 
Meel, A. (2007). Dynamic Risk Assessment of Inherently Safer Chemical Processes: 
An Accident Precursor Approach. 
Meel, A., O’neill, L., Levin, J., Seider, W. D., Oktem, U. and Keren, N. (2007a). 
Operational Risk Assessment of Chemical Industries by Exploiting Accident 
Databases. Journal of loss prevention in the process industries, 20(2), 113-
127. 
Meel, A., O’neill, L. M., Levin, J. H., Seider, W. D., Oktem, U. and Keren, N. 
(2007b). Operational Risk Assessment of Chemical Industries by Exploiting 
Accident Databases. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 
20(2), 113-127. 
Meel, A. and Seider, W. D. (2006). Plant-Specific Dynamic Failure Assessment 
Using Bayesian Theory. Chemical Engineering Science, 61(21), 7036-7056. 
Meel, A. and Seider, W. D. (2008). Real-Time Risk Analysis of Safety Systems. 
Computers & Chemical Engineering, 32(4), 827-840. 
Mili, A., Bassetto, S., Siadat, A. and Tollenaere, M. (2009). Dynamic Risk 
Management Unveil Productivity Improvements. Journal of Loss Prevention 
in the Process Industries, 22(1), 25-34. 
Minarick, J. and Kukielka, C. (1982). Precursors to Potential Severe Core Damage 
Accidents, 1969-1979, a Status Report. The Commission. 
195 
 
 
 
Mingguang, Z. and Juncheng, J. (2008). An Improved Probit Method for Assessment 
of Domino Effect to Chemical Process Equipment Caused by Overpressure. 
Journal of hazardous materials, 158(2), 280-286. 
Modarres, M. and Amico, P. (1984). Ler Categorization Report. Martin Marietta 
Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and University of 
Maryland, College Park. November, 13. 
Montague, D. F. (1990). Process Risk Evaluation—What Method to Use? Reliability 
Engineering &amp; System Safety, 29(1), 27-53. 
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